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INTEREST OF AMICI1
The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) is a law firm committed
to insuring the ongoing viability of constitutional freedoms in accordance with
principles of justice. ACLJ attorneys have argued or participated as amicus curiae
in numerous cases involving constitutional issues before the Supreme Court of the
United States and lower federal courts.
This brief is also filed on behalf of United States Representatives Paul
Broun, Todd Akin, Rob Bishop, John Boehner, Michael Burgess, Dan Burton, Eric
Cantor, Mike Conaway, Mary Fallin, John Fleming, Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks,
Scott Garrett, Louie Gohmert, Bob Goodlatte, Jeb Hensarling, Walter Jones, Steve
King, Doug Lamborn, Robert Latta, Michael McCaul, Cathy McMorris Rodgers,
Jerry Moran, Mike Pence, Jean Schmidt, Lamar Smith, Todd Tiahrt, and Zach
Wamp. These amici currently are members of the United States House of
Representatives in the One Hundred Eleventh Congress.
This brief is also filed on behalf of the Constitutional Committee to
Challenge the President and Congress on Health Care, which consists of over
70,000 Americans from across the country who oppose the individual mandate.
Amici are dedicated to the founding principles of limited government, and to
1

This amici curiae brief is filed upon motion for leave to file. The Plaintiff has
consented to the participation of movants as amici in this case. The Defendant,
when contacted, stated that it takes no position on movants’ motion for leave.

the corollary precept that the Commerce Clause contains boundaries that Congress
may not trespass no matter how serious the nation’s healthcare problems. Amici
believe that the individual insurance mandate provision of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (hereinafter PPACA) exceeds any power granted under
the Commerce Clause. Moreover, amici believe that no jurisdictional impediment
exists to deciding this case now because of the costs states must incur now or in the
near future to prepare to implement the PPACA.
ARGUMENT
James Madison wrote, “The powers delegated . . . to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George
W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001). “In the first place it is to be remembered
that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making
and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated
objects . . . .” The Federalist No. 14, at 65 (James Madison) (Id.).
Put simply, Congress cannot pass just any law that seems to most
efficiently address a national problem. Every federal law must derive from one of

2

the grants of authority found in the Constitution. This the individual insurance
mandate does not do.
Although its Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflects a drift away from the
Founders’ vision of limited federal government, the Supreme Court has
nonetheless steadily affirmed the foundational principle that limits on federal
authority are essential to liberty. “Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation
of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (the constitutionally mandated division of
authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental
liberties” (quoting Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458)).
Interpreting the Commerce power in this case to enable Congress to force
American citizens to purchase health insurance would place Americans’ economic
liberty in serious jeopardy. There is no principled basis for limiting such power to
health insurance purchases because every purchasing decision may have a rippling
effect on interstate commerce.

3

I.

The Commerce Clause Does Not Empower Congress to Coerce
Individual Purchases Merely Because Decisions not to Purchase Affect
Interstate Commerce.
The individual health insurance mandate is a novelty in Congress’s

regulatory history. For the first time, Congress has asserted the power to coerce
commercial transactions. The Commerce Clause has never been understood,
however, to regulate inactivity. Every one of the Supreme Court’s cases deals with
economic activity or “endeavor.” See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 611 (2000).
Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that the commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). After more than a
half century of increasingly imaginative interpretation,2 in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the
2

The most notorious example of the Court’s expansive understanding of the
Commerce Clause is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), in which the
Court held that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate how much
wheat a farmer could grow, even for his own personal consumption.
4

Court reaffirmed the notion that there are limits to Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.
In Lopez, the Court held the Gun Free School Zones Act unconstitutional
because it was a criminal statute that had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” 514
U.S. at 561. Nor was the Act “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.” Id. Surveying its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Court remarked that it had “upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating
intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity substantially
affected interstate commerce.” Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The Court repeatedly
emphasized that economic activity was what triggered Congress’s Commerce
Clause power to regulate. The Court concluded that:
To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of
our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great
deference to congressional action. The broad language in these
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we
decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This
we are unwilling to do.

5

Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the
Court has a “duty to recognize meaningful limits on the commerce power of
Congress,” and “[t]he statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that
renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power . . . .”).
In Morrison, the Court held § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional, again because the class of activities regulated was not economic.
Holding that the law was beyond the scope of the commerce power, 529 U.S. at
617, the Court reiterated that “where we have sustained federal regulation of
intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” Id.
at 611 (emphasis added).
Thus, Lopez and Morrison establish that the Commerce Clause power is
limited to economic activity, however local or trivial in scope. See, e.g., Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (regulation of marijuana grown for home use);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (regulation of wheat grown for personal
consumption). But there must be activity. To be engaged in commerce, one must
actually be doing something.

Not even the most expansive Supreme Court

Commerce Clause cases support the notion that Congress can regulate inactivity,
or coerce commercial activity where none exists.

6

If Congress can coerce a commercial transaction by simply asserting, as it
did in the PPACA, that coercing the transaction “is commercial and economic in
nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,” PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111148, §1501(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and listing a series of “Effects on the
National Economy and Interstate Commerce,” id. §1501(a)(2), amended by
§10106(a), then the universe of commercial transactions Congress could compel
would be practically limitless. Under Raich and Wickard, no commercial activity
can be considered too trivial or local to elude the Commerce power. When that
principle is coupled with the federal government’s implicit assumption in the
PPACA that Congress can regulate commercial inactivity by coercing citizens to
purchase any given product, there is no obstacle to an economy completely
controlled by the federal government.
For example, the federal government bailed out General Motors under the
authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in part in 12 U.S.C. §§5201-02, 5211-41). This act
created the “Troubled Assets Relief Program” (“TARP”), which allowed the
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions and
to guarantee troubled assets issued before March 14, 2008. 12 U.S.C. §§
5211(a)(1), 5212(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). The Act also established the Financial
Stability Oversight Board, which reviews programs developed under the Act,

7

makes recommendations to the Treasury Department, and reports suspected fraud.
12 U.S.C. § 5214 (Supp. II 2008). In December 2008, the U.S. Treasury authorized
loans of up to $13.4 billion of TARP funds for General Motors and $4.0 billion of
TARP funds for Chrysler. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary
Paulson Statement on Stabilizing the Automotive Industry (Dec. 19, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1332.htm.
Based on the foregoing history, Congress could rationally determine that
requiring all Americans above a certain income level to purchase a new GM or
Chrysler automobile would address the instability of a segment of the American
automotive industry and help ensure that the bailout’s purpose—GM’s and
Chrysler’s survival—is achieved. Under Congress’s reasoning, the decision
whether to buy a car is “commercial and economic in nature, and [when
aggregated with all similar decisions] substantially affects interstate commerce.”
Similarly, to shore up the financial services industry, Congress could compel
Americans to make certain investments with Lehman Brothers.3 To foster the
nation’s energy independence, any number of purchases could be compelled.
Indeed, Congress could rationally determine that a lack of exercise contributes to
3

The collapse of Lehman was the largest bankruptcy in American history, creating
massive market instability. Tiffany Kary & Chris Scinta, JP Morgan Gave Lehman
$138 Billion After Bankruptcy (Update 3), Bloomberg.com, Sep. 16, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aX7mhYCHmVf8&re
fer=home.
8

poor health, which increases health care expenses and the cost of health care
insurance, and poses a threat to Congress’s attempt to lower health care and health
care insurance costs. If so, under the reasoning that would support finding the
individual mandate a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate commerce,
Congress could require Americans to purchase health club memberships.
The government, however, posits that because “accidents or illness [will]
inevitably occur,” the uninsured will receive health care even if they cannot pay.
Mem. in Supp. of Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (hereinafter Gov. Mem.); see
generally id. at 25–30. In essence, the government presumes that all Americans
are present participants in the health care market, so that the decision whether to
buy health insurance is really a decision about how to pay for the health care they
will inevitably receive. See id. at 25-30. The government argues that the individual
mandate, therefore, regulates an economic activity by participants in a market the
federal government has power to regulate.
The government’s attempt to convert into commercial activity the decision
not to engage in commercial activity is clever but unavailing. The argument does
nothing to relieve the concern that finding the individual mandate to be a legitimate
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce would allow
Congress unprecedented power to control individual decisions concerning whether
to participate in commercial activity. Take the GM and Chrysler example. Most

9

would say that a person who does not own an automobile and is not seeking
presently to buy an automobile is not participating in the automobile market. But
the point of owning an automobile is to provide transportation, and everyone
inevitably needs to get from one place to another. Thus, all people are participants
in the broader market for transportation, a market which includes the automobile
market.

Deciding to forego buying a car and depend instead on public

transportation, taxis, or even walking is, by the government’s reasoning, engaging
in economic activity—that is, deciding which type of transportation to use—that
may be regulated by Congress if the aggregate of those decisions substantially
affects interstate commerce.
The upshot is that all private purchasing decisions (negative and affirmative)
can be characterized under the government’s theory as commercial and economic
activity and, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce. Upholding the individual
mandate to force private citizens to buy health insurance will thus strip any
remaining limits on Congress’s power to control individual economic behavior.
When President Truman attempted a similar expansion of federal power over a
substantial portion of the economy,4 the Supreme Court was keenly aware of the
threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.

As Justice Frankfurter

explained in his concurring opinion:
4

Truman attempted to seize the nation’s steel mills to ensure the economic and
financial stability of the market.
10

The Founders of this Nation were not imbued with the modern
cynicism that the only thing that history teaches is that it teaches
nothing. They acted on the conviction that the experience of man
sheds a good deal of light on his nature. It sheds a good deal of light
not merely on the need for effective power, if a society is to be at once
cohesive and civilized, but also on the need for limitations on the
power of governors over the governed.
To that end they rested the structure of our central government
on the system of checks and balances. For them the doctrine of
separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. Not
so long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks and
balances obstructive to effective government. It was easy to ridicule
that system as outmoded―too easy. The experience through which
the world has passed in our own day has made vivid the realization
that the Framers of our Constitution were not inexperienced
doctrinaires. These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our
people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities
from the hazards of concentrated power. It is absurd to see a dictator
in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the
Mississippi Valley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come
in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of
unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The principles of federalism and a federal government of limited enumerated
powers, like the separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and
balances the Youngstown Court found essential to limiting governmental power
and protecting liberty. Upholding the individual mandate would effectively confer
upon Congress “a plenary police power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all

11

individual economic decisions and place the economic liberty of all Americans at
risk.
II.

The Absence of a Severability Clause in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Increases the Likelihood of Immediate Harm
to the States.
The individual insurance mandate portions of the PPACA become effective

in 2014. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). States
must nevertheless incur immediate and significant legislative, administrative, and
other costs to prepare to fully implement the PPACA. Thus, the burdens imposed
on the states by the PPACA include not only inevitable future requirements, but
also present significant expenditures and alterations to their existing regulatory
schemes.
Most notably, the PPACA uses a system of state-based insurance exchanges.
Id. § 1321.

That system charges the states with extensive legislative and

administrative burdens in developing and administrating the exchanges.
See,

e.g.,

Posting

of

Suzy

Khimm

to

MoJo

Blog,

http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/03/how-states-could-sabotage-health-reform
(April 1, 2010, 3:00 PDT). The National Governor’s Association has recognized
the “significant role” that states play in implementing the PPACA, and that “[s]ome
components of the law must be developed and implemented quickly, while
other[s] will involve a complex set of state decisions and long-term planning

12

and

implementation.”

Reform

National

Governor’s

Implementation

Association,

Resource

Health
Center,

http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.751b186f65e10b568a278110501010a
0/?vgnextoid=7f8844ce25208210VgnVCM1000005e00100aRCRD&vgnextchanne
l=92ebc7df618a2010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD (last visited May 27, 2010).
The immediate impact the law will have on the states that amici Members of
Congress represent can be seen in the following examples:
• Virginia’s Secretary of Health and Human Resources recently announced the
establishment of a Health Care Reform Initiative “to prepare Virginia for the
implementation of federal health reform by planning for the expansion of
Medicaid eligibility.” Press Release, Virginia Secretary of Health and
Human Resources, Virginia Secretary of Health and Human Resources Dr.
Bill Hazel Announces Virginia Health Reform Initiative (May 14, 2010),
http://www.hhr.virginia.gov/News/viewRelease.cfm?id=175.

In

speaking

about the Initiative, Secretary Hazel said,
“Virginia is one of many states challenging the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Healthcare and
Education Affordability Reconciliation Act. However this
lawsuit could take two to three years to be settled. As we wait
for court decisions, the Commonwealth must comply with the
acts and begin preparing for implementation of federal health
care reform.”

13

Id. According to the press release, Virginia’s Initiative will, among other
things, “manage activities related to federal health care reform” and “serve as
the liaison between the Governor’s office, agencies and entities affected by
health care reform, lead development of the required Health Insurance
Exchange and identify and coordinate grants to fund health care reform.” Id.
Additionally, Virginia’s Governor, Bob McDonnell, “announced he will
soon hire a Health Care Reform Coordinator to help Virginia expand its
Medicaid eligibility, plan for new health care exchanges that the law
mandates in 2014 and make Virginia’s system more affordable.” Posting of
Rosalind

Helderman

to

the

Virginia

Politics

Blog,

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2010/05/former_speaker_o
f_the_house.html (May 14, 2010, 16:01 ET).
• In Washington, the legislature created the Joint Legislative Select
Committee “to oversee health care reform in Washington . . . .”
Hopper,

The

http://blog.senatedemocrats.wa.gov/the-hopper/health-reform-

implementation-panel-gets-to-work-wednesday/ (May 24, 2010). “Early
action items” for the Committee to consider “include insurance market
reforms going into effect this year, the federal high risk pool for people with
pre-existing conditions, and the state’s Medicaid waiver request to help fund
the Basic Health Plan.” Id. The co-chair of the Committee has stated that

14

“‘[t]here’s a lot of work to do here on the ground in getting these sweeping
reforms implemented’ . . . .” Id. Additionally, Governor Gregoire “signed
an executive order creating a Health Care Cabinet to implement health care
reform in Washington to maximize efficiencies and bring the full benefits of
the new law to all Washington citizens.” Press Release, Gov. Chris Gregoire,
Gov. Gregoire Takes Immediate Steps to Implement Healthcare Reform in
Washington State (April 1, 2010), http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/newsview.asp?pressRelease=1469&newsType=1.

Among other things, the

Cabinet “will write and implement the policies and rules necessary to carry
out health care reform statewide for all affected state agencies, including
consolidating duties, functions and powers related to the state’s overall
health care purchasing.” Id. The Cabinet is to report back to Governor
Gregoire by August 1, 2010, “with recommendations for any changes to
state law necessary to be submitted in the 2011 legislative session.” Id.
• The Texas Department of Insurance (“TDI”) has created a “Federal Health
Care Reform Resource Page” to update consumers on health care reform.
Texas Department of Insurance, Federal Health Care Reform Resource Page,
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/consumer/cpmhealthcare.html (last visited May
27, 2010). The website includes a link to a PowerPoint presentation given
to the House Select Committee on Federal Legislation, which includes slides
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on the “Fiscal Impact on TDI,” (which included possible “areas of increased
costs for TDI in 2010”), implementation planning, and challenges to
implementation.
Federal

Health

Implementation

Mike

Geeslin

Insurance
Planning,

&

Dianne

Reform
at

Longley,

Requirements

29-32,

Apr.

Overview
and
22,

of
TDI

2010,

http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/documents/fedhlthreform4222010.ppt.
Two of the challenges noted in the presentation were that “[p]rovisions
effective within [the] first 6 months will require aggressive implementation
effort,” and “[l]ong term fiscal planning as new federal HHS regulations are
issued periodically during next 4 years.” Id. at 32.
• The Oklahoma Insurance Department has taken steps to educate the public
on the health care legislation by creating a website with links to information
about the law. Oklahoma Insurance Department, Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, http://www.ok.gov/oid/PPAC.html (last visited May
26, 2010).
• In May, California’s Senate and Assembly health committees held a joint
hearing at which health experts testified “about the challenges California
faces in carrying out the federal health overhaul law, including the creation
of the virtual marketplace where consumers will go to buy coverage in
2014.” Victoria Colliver, State Lawmakers Discuss Health Care Challenges,
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San

Fran.

Chron.,

May

13,

2010,

available

at

http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-05-13/bay-area/20896084_1_health-lawfederal-law-new-law. At the hearing, Jon Kingsdale, the executive director
of the Health Connector, Massachusetts’s exchange, congratulated the
committee members on “tackling these tough issues so expeditiously,”
noting that
the process from legislative drafting to full implementation took
four years in Massachusetts, and we already had the insurance
reforms set forth under the federal Accountable Care Act, such
as community rating, in place in Massachusetts prior to our
2006 reform legislation. By getting a head start now, in 2010,
you can anticipate and better oversee the many changes coming
to California’s health insurance markets.
Implementation of Federal Health Care Reform, Joint Hearing Before S.
Subcomm. on Health & Human Servs. & Assembly Comm. on Health, 200910 Sess. (2009-10) (statement of Jon Kingsdale, Exec. Director,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority),
http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/committee/standing/health/California_Testim
ony_of_Jon_Kingsdale.pdf (last visited May 28, 2010).
• California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced the creation of a
Health Care Reform Taskforce to focus on implementing parts of the
PPACA, including “develop[ing] a health insurance purchasing pool so that
small businesses and individuals can shop for insurance at competitive
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rates.” Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Press Conference to Discuss Federal
Health Care Reform (Apr. 29, 2010), http://gov.ca.gov/speech/15034/. He
also stated that he would “call a special session, if necessary, to ensure that
we make the required statutory changes on time.” Id.
If certain provisions of the PPACA are altered or ruled unconstitutional, the
costs incurred by states could well go for naught. This is especially so given that
the PPACA contains no severability provision.

Generally, invalidating one

provision of a law as unconstitutional does not invalidate the rest of the law,
provided the unconstitutional provisions are severable from the other provisions.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). Here, however, under the
generally applicable rules concerning severability, the individual mandate is not
severable.
The Supreme Court has set forth its standard for determining whether
severance is possible: “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Id.
(internal quotations marks omitted); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla.,
286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). “The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is
essentially an inquiry into legislative intent.” Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
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Indians, 526 U.S. at 191. Nevertheless, “Congress could not have intended a
constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if
the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning independently.” Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 684. A court must ask “whether [after removing the
invalid provision] the [remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with
the intent of Congress.” Id. at 685 (original emphasis omitted).
Even where a severability clause is present, courts must decide whether the
unconstitutional portions of the challenged act are “so intertwined” with other
provisions, that the other provisions cannot stand. In Hill v. Wallace, Congress
enacted a scheme to control Boards of Trade associated with the sale of grain, and
enacted a penalty tax to compel compliance. 259 U.S. 44, 63-64 (1922). The Court
found the tax provisions unconstitutional and ruled that the regulatory provisions
must also fail because they were “so interwoven” with the tax provision they could
not operate separately. Id. at 70.
Here, two factors lead to the conclusion that the individual mandate is not
severable: First, Congress removed a severability clause from the original House
bill. Second, by the government’s own assertion, the remaining portions of the bill
cannot function without the individual mandate provision.
First, the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962) passed the
House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. OpenCongress, H.R. 3962–

19

Affordable Health Care for America Act, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111h3962/show (last visited May 27, 2010). That Act contained a severability
provision, section 255, that would have allowed other provisions of the Act to
remain in force if any specific provision was found unconstitutional. Affordable
Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 (2009) (engrossed as
agreed to or passed by House), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3962eh.txt.pdf. However, the
bill passed by both Houses and signed into law by the President—The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act—lacks any such severability provision. Pub.
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). That Congress failed to include a severability
provision in the final bill indicates that Congress did not intend for the bill’s
individual provisions to be severable.
Moreover, as the government repeatedly asserts, see Gov. Mem. at 3-4, 8,
19, 30-33, the individual insurance mandate is related to other provisions of the
PPACA in such a way that without it, the elaborate insurance scheme enacted by
the PPACA could not function as intended. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Alaska Airlines, Inc., Congress could not have intended the insurance
mandate to be severable if severing it would allow an inoperable regulatory scheme
to stand. See 480 U.S. at 684. Specifically, one of the PPACA’s more touted
provisions forbids providers from refusing health insurance coverage to individuals
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on the basis of preexisting conditions. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). Without the insurance mandate provision, an individual could refrain from
purchasing health insurance coverage until he incurred an actual injury or illness
requiring medical care. As Congress recognized in its own findings,
Under sections 27045 and 27056 of the Public Health Service
Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there were no
[individual mandate] requirement, many individuals would wait to
purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly
increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection
and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue
and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.
Id. §1501(a)(2)(I), amended by§10106(a).
The PPACA would forbid insurers from denying coverage. Without the
individual mandate, the potential for free-riding could soon result in the insolvency
of any private or co-operative insurance provider that depends on premium dollars.
The PPACA contains exchanges made up of insurance providers, but does not
contain any completely government administered and supported plan or so-called
“public option.” See generally Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Because
5

“Prohibition of Preexisting Condition Exclusions or other Discrimination Based
on Health Status.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (section 1201 of the PPACA amends “Part A of
title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg et seq.) . . . .”).
6
“Prohibiting Discrimination Against Individual Participants and Beneficiaries
Based on Health Status.” Id.
21

the envisioned health care insurance providers would depend upon premium
dollars, the individual mandate is designed to bolster the providers’ solvency in
each insurance exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory scheme.
See also Gov. Mem. at 31-33 (explaining how the individual mandate is connected
to other parts of the PPACA).
Because the individual mandate is so essential to the overall operation of the
PPACA, it is highly probable that without it, there would be no PPACA.7 In this

7

This is not to say that the interconnection between the individual mandate and the
rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the issue of severability, is a basis for
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper Clause. Although the Court noted in
Raich that the laws upheld in Wickard and Raich were essential parts of a
regulatory scheme, Raich does not stand for the broad proposition that Congress is
free to pass otherwise unconstitutional laws by somehow connecting them to a
larger regulatory program. Wickard and Raich held that federal regulation of a
particular type of economic activity—the production and consumption of a
marketable commodity—can, in some circumstances, be applied to reach that type
of existing economic activity at a purely local level when regulating that local
economic activity, in the aggregate, is necessary and proper to the effective
national regulation of that economic activity.
Here, by contrast, Congress is not seeking to regulate existing local
economic activity as a necessary component of regulating that type of economic
activity nationwide, but rather has forced individuals who are not engaged in the
economic activity of buying and maintaining health insurance to do so. The
PPACA is akin to a law that would force people not presently farming to grow and
sell wheat. Congress can find no support from Wickard, Raich, or other cases for
the proposition that it can—for the first time in our Nation’s history—declare that
individuals who are not engaged in a particular economic activity must engage in
that activity solely because other statutory provisions are attached to and connected
with that mandate.
22

sense, while the individual mandate is not itself directed at state governments,
without that mandate there can be little doubt that the provisions that do directly
affect states—for example, the insurance exchanges and Medicaid eligibility
expansion—would not exist. Therefore, but for the individual mandate, states
would not have to incur the present costs that the PPACA imposes on them.
That the individual mandate is not severable from the federal insurance
regulatory scheme enacted under the PPACA only exacerbates the harm to the
states. If the individual mandate is found unconstitutional, the entire health care
scheme created by the PPACA would unravel, and the significant regulatory and
administrative costs the states must soon incur to comply with the PPACA’s
requirements will be in vain. In fact, not only will states incur these costs to no
avail, it is likely that states will have to undergo further expenditures to return their
individual systems to a workable model. These significant economic harms to the
states could be avoided by adjudicating the constitutionality of the individual
mandate provisions now, before the states undertake additional costs and sweeping
and costly legislative and regulatory action.
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CONCLUSION
Amici therefore respectfully request that the Court deny the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.
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